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Synthetic Logic as the Philosophical Underpinning for 
Apophatic Theology 
 
Commentary on A Philosophy of the Unsayable 
by Stephen Palmquist 
 
 
What’s in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet. 
 
THESE WELL-WORN LINES from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet couldn’t be 
more true—and more misleading, if William Franke’s wide-ranging exposition on 
“the unsayable” is taken to heart. The book’s six numbered chapters, divided into two 
parts consisting of three chapters each, are framed by short chapters fancifully entitled 
“Pre-face” and “Inconclusion”. These word-plays accurately reflect the author’s 
tendency to stretch words beyond their ordinary meanings to make points that are 
often (intentionally?) only partially expressed. Thus, despite its unusual title, the 
opening Pre-face is strikingly similar to a standard preface; yet its title’s unexplained 
hyphen bears silent witness to the book’s apophatic premise (p.2), that “discourse” is 
always “necessarily preceded by and predicated on what cannot be said.” Likewise, 
the book’s concluding chapter is refreshingly straightforward, offering a clear and 
succinct statement of the book’s accomplishments and limitations, saying nothing 
about its non-standard title. The reader is thus again left wondering: is the provocative 
title meant to imply that, “in conclusion”, the cryptic style permeating the book 
(thanks to which the book aptly exemplifies the thesis it promulgates) is being set 
aside and replaced by a more straightforward use of language, or that this final 
statement of the book’s purpose, despite its definitive appearance, remains ultimately 
“inconclusive”? 
 
The three chapters of Part I address themes relating to the interface between 
philosophy and literature. Chapter One, elusively entitled “Invitatory”, boldly 
introduces the book’s central claim (p.21): “Any language capable of making 
determinate statements pivots on an internal distinction between that in it 
which…remains unsayable versus that which it is able to articulate.” Although Franke 
has thereby stated that this distinction exists, he assumes the “mechanism” that keeps 
it in place “is itself below the threshold of the articulable” (p.21)—an ellipsis I shall 
fill later in this essay by showing that language about “the unsayable” has a 
distinctive logical form that can be stated. Chapter Two (“In the Hollow of Pan’s 
Pipe”) adopts Hegel’s philosophy as a sounding board: guided by the (implied) 
metaphor that language is like music (for it conveys meaning more through the space 
hollowed out by the instrument of our words than by the words themselves), Franke 
portrays the philosopher of Absolute Spirit, who writes as if he can say it all, as in fact 
carving out a space for a silent experience of Truth and Totality that transcends any of 
his written words. Chapter Three juxtaposes two post-holocaust poets, Edmond Jabès 
and Paul Celan, in hopes of demonstrating (p.81) that “each in a different way lends 
language to silence in order to give voice to the unspeakable.” Taken together, these 
three chapters establish “the paradigm of apophasis as a mode of poetry and of 
discourse generally” (p.134). Given their unmistakably poetic style, they read more 
like works of art than philosophical essays per se. Like a good painting, one can dip in 
and out of their kaleidoscope of images, without needing to digest them 
systematically; the masterful achievement of their synthesis deserves appreciation, as 
long as the word “philosophy” is not interpreted too narrowly. Thus, when Franke 
writes of the “feigned and literally ‘fictive’ truths” that characterize all “discourse” 
(p.77), he must have literary discourse in mind; consigning all truth-claims to this fate 
would destroy science as we know it and render philosophy nothing but an art form. 
For philosophy and science assume a logical form that poetry and art may freely 
ignore. 
 
Part II’s three chapters address themes relating to the interface between philosophy 
and theology. Chapter Four interprets various postmodern French philosophers as 
faithful participants in the Neoplatonic tradition of negative theology. The historical 
roots of the postmodern suspicion of all foundations, Franke maintains, stretch back to 
Parmenides, for whom all knowledge rests on a “One” that is not a foundation 
because it is ineffable (p.145): “nothing at all can be said of the One that must not also, 
at the same time, be unsaid. It cannot even be said unequivocally to be One.” From 
Parmenides to Damascius, these thinkers prefigure the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, 
whose path from an “aggressively anti-theological” nay-sayer (p.158) to an equally 
ardent defender of Christianity as an essentially de-constructive faith (pp.165f) 
exhibits the depth and passion of all apophatic reasoning. Chapter Five similarly 
unearths apophatic undercurrents in the work of theologian John Milbank and his 
Radical Orthodoxy movement, for whom Kant and Enlightenment “transcendentals” 
are to blame for whatever problems plague the modern world, and ingeniously shows 
that “the ancient theological hymn” shares much in common with such “postmodern 
philosophical theology” (p.257). Chapter Six concludes Part II with a daring synthesis 
of Radical Orthodoxy and “postmodern secular theology” (p.270); it turns out that 
both contemporary theologically currents share a “common basis in critical, apophatic 
insight into the generative source of reality, culture, and language”, calling us to a 
new path of “openness to the ‘radically Other.’” 
 
A central claim, running like a thread through Franke’s work, is the ultimate 
contingency of all names—including (especially) the divine Name that is in fact no 
name because it is beyond naming. Given the significance of this claim to the book’s 
deep message, the author’s ironic habit of name-dropping can be disconcerting at 
times. One paragraph occupying merely 18 lines (p.56) mentions nine names with 
barely a hint as to which of their ideas are being cited. (Five lines near the top of 
p.178 similarly rattle off four names.) Admittedly, this tendency exhibits the truly 
impressive breadth of Franke’s knowledge of relevant literature; yet by merely 
naming so many interrelated thinkers he risks alienating his readers, for those who 
have digested the ideas defended by the scholars whose names so frequently season 
the text do not need to have the text salted with these names in order to taste of the 
relevance of their ideas, while those who are unaware of these scholars’ work are left 
hungry whenever the salt appears without the food of any substantive ideas for it to 
flavor. When Franke names a given author without offering a word of explanation as 
to which of that author’s ideas he is highlighting, his attempt to season the text may 
paradoxically result in the salt losing its savor. 
 
This book’s poetic style and theological undertones give rise to a key question: Is this 
kind of writing properly named philosophy? Franke repeatedly refers to the apophatic 
tradition as primarily a form of (“negative”) theology, and both the form and content 
of the book frequently exhibit a literary flair that is uncharacteristic of standard 
philosophical prose. In keeping with the book’s apophatic theme, however, let me 
clarify what a negative answer to this question would imply. If we respect Franke’s 
own terms, then stating that the book is not a work of philosophy would not 
necessarily imply that it is unphilosohical. Rather, it might merely indicate that the 
book attempts to adumbrate the philosophy of negating the philosophical. Indeed, this 
is implied on the very cover of the book, where the word “UNSAYABLE” is overlaid 
with a thin-lined “X”. Obviously, in order to philosophize, one must be able to say 
what one is thinking about. So writing a book about “the unsayable” paradoxically 
requires negating the very thing one is attempting to exhibit. 
 
Ironies and paradoxes, such as those that permeate this book, are inevitable whenever 
one uses words in an attempt to describe what is essentially mysterious. Nevertheless, 
Franke’s exposition could have been rendered considerably clearer, and its core 
(philosophical!) message significantly strengthened, had he adopted an explicit 
position on the nature of apophatic logic. Franke repeatedly hints that he thinks such a 
logic is possible, as when he praises “Nancy’s anti-logic of sense” for being “exactly 
what I have been calling ‘apophatic’” (p.183). Yet he never fleshes out what this 
possible “mechanism” of the unsayable, this “anti-logic of discourse” (p.60; cf. p.132), 
would entail—perhaps because, even though we must always “assume terms and 
apply rules”, these “can never be completely articulated or explained” (p.22; cf. 
p.151). As a result, his whole book might appear to some readers to suffer the same 
fate as the playwrights discussed in Chapter Two, whose work is ultimately 
“senseless—except inasmuch as they expose a radical senselessness at the root of 
speaking per se” (pp.77-78). Poets might accept this fate—as might Franke himself, 
insofar as his writing aims to be poetic; but should the philosopher settle for nothing 
more than using ultimately “senseless” words to evoke an experience of 
“senselessness”? 
 
Saving this masterful book from such a disconcerting predicament is not as difficult 
as Franke’s silence on the matter might suggest. In various publications (see e.g., The 
Tree of Philosophy, Chapter 5) I have distinguished between “analytic logic” (which 
bases propositional truth on the application of Aristotle’s laws of identity, 
noncontradiction, and excluded middle) and its negation, called “synthetic logic” 
(based on the negation of Aristotle’s three key logical laws—which I call the laws of 
nonidentity, contradiction, and included middle). A conscious awareness of how 
synthetic logic operates in the use and interpretation of apophatic language would go 
a long way in removing the impression some readers may have that Franke’s use of 
language is intentionally mystifying and even obscurantist rather than being genuinely 
philosophical. That is, when synthetic logic is clearly in view, words can be used in a 
way that makes sense even though, according to their literal meaning (i.e., according 
to the standards of analytic logic), they remain senseless. This does not resolve the 
paradox of the unsayable; it still requires the word “unsayable” in the book’s title to 
be crossed out. But it explains why crossing out this crucial name is more than just 
word-play, why apophatic language must be paradoxical. Indeed, one of the main 
themes running through Franke’s book is that apophatic language is the negation of 
language; it is but a small step from this insight to the awareness that apophatic 
language attains the status of philosophy through its grounding in synthetic logic. 
 
A few brief examples will illustrate how synthetic logic makes sense out of language 
that might otherwise appear to be but a literary game, revealing it to be a genuinely 
philosophical mode of exposition. The law of nonidentity (A≠A) grounds many of 
Franke’s truth-claims: it explains how Franke can truly say, for example, that 
Shakespeare’s Bottom “says [A]…what cannot [≠] be said [A]” (pp.13-14) and that 
apophatic “language…negates itself as language” (p.61) through “discourse undoing 
its own identity” (p.65). Likewise, the law of contradiction (A=-A) grounds claims 
such as that the “pregnant pauses” (A) created between apophatic words nonetheless 
“point to an ultimate impotence [-A] of the word” (p.18; cf. p.68), and that the goal in 
apophatism is “that language [A] must annihilate itself [i.e., be -A]” (p.120). And the 
law of included middle (A=A+-A or 1=0) is the logical basis for Franke’s claim that 
“[w]e understand only on the basis of what we do not understand” (p.28), so that 
“everything that is” (1) is “deriv[ed] from Nothing” (0). At one point Franke himself 
inadvertently expresses all three laws in one sentence (p.57): “The unsayable [0] must 
be expressed in contradictory forms [i.e., A=-A] because it can have no proper 
identity of its own [A≠A] but exerts absolute, decisive influence in all directions 
[A=A+-A] on everything else [1=0].” 
 
That Franke does not explicitly acknowledge anything like synthetic logic as the 
linguistic foundation for apophatic discourse should not detract from the impressive 
achievement his book makes. Indeed, I know of no other work that manages to evoke 
the depths of the Nothing that is Everything in so many profound and interesting ways. 
Naming is the ultimate human act of creativity. It distinguishes us from all other 
animal beings while uniting us with the unspeakable One that religions call God, Kant 
calls “the supersensible”, and postmodern nihilists call “the Other”. What Franke’s 
book shows, without ever saying so, is that nothing is more important than names. 
View publication stats
